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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Available land: There is a perception that Britain is a small country, mainly developed and 
with little space for more housing. The Barker Report (2006) revealed that more than half the 
population thought that at least half of the land in the country was developed. As the Land 
Cover data of 2005 showed this is not remotely true. If gardens are included as ‘green’, only 
27.5 percent of even the GLA area is ‘urban’ and of South East England only 4.7 percent is 
covered by any sort of building. The purpose of the Green Belt is to prevent development – 
not to retain accessible or beautiful countryside: that is the function of National Parks. Areas 
of Outstanding Natural Beauty protect scenically attractive countryside but do not facilitate 
public access. Green Belt designation, the purpose of which is exclusively to prevent 
building, covers1.63 million hectares, 12.3 percent of England’s surface: all buildings and 
gardens, including roads, railways and paths, cover some 8.53 percent of England’s surface. 
Prices and affordability: Because the stock of houses is so large relative to new building, 
changes in supply and demand (which of course determine price changes) only have a slow 
and cumulative effect. So it is essential to look at long term trends. These show that while the 
real prices of housing and housing land were more or less constant – although fluctuating 
with the economic cycle as that influenced demand – up until the mid-1950s, since then the 
real price of housing has increased 4.5-fold and that of housing land 15-fold. Affordability,  
measured as the ratio of median house prices to median incomes has continued to deteriorate 
and across British city regions ranged from a low of 2.75 in Burnley to 8.16 in London. 
International standards suggest a ratio of 3 is acceptably ‘affordable’. 
New housing supply: Housing supply consists of the stock of existing dwellings and the 
flow of new development – new supply: in Britain this is commonly only about 1 percent a 
year of the existing stock. There are two competing measures of new supply: 1) Net new 
dwellings; and 2) Completions – new houses built. In this report we favour completions, 
despite the increasing recent popularity of net new dwellings as a measure of new supply. 
Completed houses built can be unambiguously counted and data have been available for a 
long period. We show the total for England for every year since 1946 and, for the area now 
covered by the Greater London Authority, since 1871. More importantly, because net new 
dwellings net out demolition and include subdivision of existing houses, the shorter is supply, 
the more this measure exceeds that of completions. When building rates were higher in the 
1970s unfit houses were demolished and the incentive to subdivide was weaker, so net new 
dwellings was a smaller number than completions. The reverse is true now. 
The rate of building has been in long term decline. This is most obviously seen in the very 
long run series for the GLA area: in the nine years from 1930, the mean annual building rate 
was 63,934; in the nine years from 1960 it was 28,331; and in the most recent nine years 
20,202. Moreover building rates are consistently higher in low demand markets than in high 
demand ones. Over the nearly 40 years from 1980 to 2018 a total of 56,340 houses were 
completed in Barnsley and Doncaster while population increased in those cities by 22,796. In 
Oxford and Cambridge 29,430 houses were built against population growth of 95,079. 
Land Use: The area of Green Belt land has over the long term been remarkably stable. We 
found a data source for 1973 which showed that at that time the total area of land already 
designated or being considered for Green Belt designation was 1,681.1 Ha. Allowing for land 
which was switched into the New Forest National Park that would be a total area of 1,633.8 
Ha in 1973 compared to the observed total area for 2018 of 1,629.5 Ha. 
Over the more than 30 years from 1990 to 2011 in most regions the majority of new 
residential development was on already developed land. At one extreme, in Wales, 66.3 
percent of new housing was on previously undeveloped land; at the other, London, this figure 
was only 12.8 percent. Over the country as a whole remarkably little land moved from 
undeveloped land to residential development: the two regions losing the most land to housing 
were the East Midlands and the South East but even in these regions this was no more than 
0.05 percent of the total area. 
Land allocation: One of the most unexpected findings of the work embodied in this report is 
the fact that, despite its importance to the planning process and to the housing market, there 
is, in effect, no data on the supply of land allocated to housing. There is only one central 
source of data: the now 10 year old information on the percentage of 5-Years’ land supply all 
those LAs reporting, claimed to have. Apart from its age, this data is not fit for purpose: it is 
entirely opaque in that the embodied assumptions on expected rates of increase of household 
numbers and assumed densities are not stated so cannot be tested; even the numbers are not 
available. Moreover, when we compare these numbers with the little data we have been able 
to find on actual current supply of allocated land, the two measures are entirely uncorrelated: 
R2=0.005.  
The alternative source of data is individual LA plans. The LSE team and, before them, Knight 
Frank, expended considerable efforts trying to collect this data. To do this it is necessary to 
contact LAs individually. Less than half of all LAs in fact have up to date (approved within 
the past five years) plans, so much of the data available is up to 20 years old. Although there 
are national standards for the processes LAs should go through to generate land allocations, 
this is done by individual LAs and they use different categories of allocation, idiosyncratic 
methodologies and entirely idiosyncratic reporting systems. So there is nothing that any 
researcher can classify as consistent information on land allocations. Combining the least 
unreliable values for those LAs the LSE team obtained with the most comparable values 
obtained by Knight Frank did yield data on land allocated for 73 LAs. But there must be very 
considerable reservations about the validity of these numbers. Not only are they uncorrelated 
with the 2009 measure but they are also totally uncorrelated with past population growth in 
the LA and since land allocations are supposed to reflect expected future population growth 
this seems anomalous, to say the least.  
Conclusions: There is a serious and growing crisis of housing supply and affordability 
substantially, but not only, caused by a long term failure to allow enough land to be used for 
building. This in turn is mainly caused by policy constraints imposed on land supply since the 
evidence shows that the quantity of suitable land is very great – far exceeding the area of all 
existing development even avoiding all land with any environmental or amenity designation. 
There also appears to be a problem with information and a fragmented and idiosyncratic 
system for allocating land for residential use. Other factors – such as fiscal incentives and 
infrastructure constraints – are no doubt also significant but outside the scope of this work. 
 
 
1. The Foundations of our Housing Crisis: two critical myths and misconceptions 
 
This report sets out to inform the debate on land supply and its role in our crisis of housing 
affordability by providing data, and the best research evidence available, to address two 
myths or misconceptions on which the crisis is founded.  
 
The first of these is that ‘Britain is a small island’ so there is just a nature-governed shortage 
of land for housing and unless we vigilantly ration the space available for building we are in 
danger of ‘concreting over Britain’. 
 
The second misconception is that if our planning system allocates land according to ‘housing 
need’, assessed on the basis of forecast growth in local household numbers, then supply of 
land for housing is in balance; and, by implication, if prices rise and affordability declines 
something else is at work. Or, in the words of Alain Berthaud:  
“Urban planners are normative, that is they base their decisions on best practice…high 
land prices are often deplored but are usually thought to be caused by 
speculators…few planners make a connection between land prices and rents, and the 
supply of land and floorspace. “ (Berthaud, 2019, page 9) 
 
The paper proceeds by first assembling information on the actual amount of land in Britain 
and how it is used and the origins of the ‘small island myth’. Modern remote sensing and GIS 
technology have made collecting data on land use a precise process. We do know how much 
land is built on, how much is suitable for building on and how much, even though physically 
suitable and even appropriate in environmental terms, is unavailable because of particular 
policies. We can also track how much land has changed use over time and what type of land 
new building has been on. The further back in time we go, the less detailed the answers must 
be but there is quite good data from the 1930s. To anticipate: the answer to these questions 
will surprise most people: for example, in 2005 only 4.3 percent of the whole surface of 
England had any building on it at all. 
 
It then moves on to how the price and so affordability of housing is determined. The price of 
land in any use is determined by the forces of demand and supply. The demand for land for 
housing is determined by people’s preferences for it as, say, garden space or space inside 
houses, together with their capacity to pay – determined by incomes. Preferences for any 
good – including land – are influenced by a number of factors such as household size but also 
of the consumption of goods like cars, swimming pools or pool tables which are 
complementary to land. Demand is also of course influenced by the number of people 
wanting land/housing. ‘Need’ – until 2018 the only the metric the planning system used to 
allocate land for housing1 – has been calibrated only on the basis of projected household 
numbers. Since 2018 some adjustment is supposed to be made for local affordability but it is 
too early to judge whether this will make any substantive difference. So the planning concept 
of ‘need’ has historically had almost no relationship to the concept of demand but it is 
demand in interaction with supply that determines price.   
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 Although as we demonstrate in Section 3, what evidence there is contradicts even this rationale for how much 
land to allocate: actual land allocations are not correlated with population growth. 
Economic research, however, has shown quite convincingly that of the factors influencing 
demand for land, income is by far the most influential (see Cheshire et al., 2014 or 
Muellbauer, 2018) and numbers have quite surprisingly little impact. On the supply side local 
land allocations are based only on numbers and price plays no part in influencing how much 
land is allocated. So we end up with a system where not only does supply not respond to 
price – local plans do not increase land allocations because houses are expensive – but it 
ignores the most important influences on demand. So long as our planning system supplies 
land only on the basis of projected household numbers – ‘need’ – it is inevitable that it 
undersupplies land, so inevitably generates ever rising house prices. 
 
Running out of land: the gap between perception and reality 
 
The emotive rhetoric surrounding land supply in Britain, in general, and England in 
particular, has been significant in conditioning popular perceptions of the availability of land 
for both housing and other urban uses, as well as the actual supply of unbuilt land. It also 
distorts both the purpose and effect of land designations such as Green Belts or Areas of 
Outstanding Natural Beauty, even National Parks. 
 
The emotive use of language designed to influence perceptions is illustrated in phrases such 
as: ‘Britain is a small Island’; or the threat of ‘concreting over England’ or ‘balanced growth’. 
Whether or not Britain is a small island is a matter of relative perception: smaller than 
Australia or Greenland but much bigger than Iceland or Singapore. In either case the relevant 
issue is not how big an island is but how efficiently its land supply can accommodate its 
demands for space. The claim that there is a danger of concreting over England simply does 
not bear examination: in the current phrase, it is fake news. As we show below there is not 
enough concrete in the whole of Europe to concrete over the 72 percent of the surface of the 
GLA area which is not built on, let alone concrete over England. Balanced growth sounds 
sensible. But turning it round reveals its rhetorical construction: who could argue for 
unbalanced growth? 
 
Artistic licence or propaganda: the threat of urban development? 
 
Disentangling misconceptions from propaganda is not as easy as one might think. One can 
see this in artistic illustrations of the countryside and the ‘threat’ of development. In this 
debate arguably one of the most influential illustrations ever is the Punch cartoon of the 
heroic Mr William Smith answering the call of his country in 1914 and returning to find the 
idealised rural idyll he left despoiled by foul industrialisation in 1918 (Figure 1). This was 
influential in that it was used by Clough Williams-Ellis as the visual signature for the book 
The Octopus and England, a book which catalysed the foundation of the CPRE in 1928. But 
the cartoonist might have been well aware of the distortion it represented: it was, after all, a 
joke. On the other hand not only was it an emblem of CPRE’s foundation but it informed the 
mind set which established the 1950 Holford Plan for Cambridge. This was explicitly 
designed to prevent Cambridge ‘suffering’ the fate of Oxford and experiencing significant 
economic growth. 
 
This popular perception of the threat to the countryside and the fragility of protected status 
by, for example, Green Belt designations, persists as Figure 2 demonstrates. This is from 
Private Eye in 2003. 
 
Figure 1: Prefatory cartoon: Punch, 17 September 1919 
 
 
Figure 2: Private Eye 2003 
One should not be surprised by these perceptions: they are both informed by, and inform, 
political pressure groups lobbying for countryside protection or NIMBYism depending on 
viewpoint. Table 1, taken from Barker 2006, shows that opinion surveys reveal more than 
half of the population believe that more than half of England is ‘developed’. The best data 
available at that time suggested that the reality was 8.3 percent. More recent and particularly 
more accurate data available since the Generalised Land Use data for 2005 became available 
suggests a figure of 9.95 percent might have been more accurate. 
 
Table 1: Public Opinion – What percentage of land in England is Developed? 
Perceived % Developed in England 
 
Perceived % land developed % responses 
75% or more 10 
50 to 75% 21 
About 50% 23 
25 to 50% 19 
25% or less 13 
Don’t know 15 
Source: Barker 2006 
 
 
What are the facts of Land Use: a summary? 
 
 
Table 2: Actual Land Use 
 
Sites of Special Scientific Interest 8.2 
Special Protection Areas 4.7 
Special Areas of Conservation 6.2 
Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty 15.6 
Greenbelt 12.9 
National Parks 7.6 
All Urban Area 8.3/9.95* 
 
Source Barker, 2006: * Land Use Futures, 2010 
 
 
However even that is only a part of the story. Of all the land in urban areas, nearly half that 
was built–on, was ‘green’. This is shown in Table 3. Land Use Future’s (2010) results show 
that of the 9.95 percent of England that they estimated was developed, by far the largest 
amount of land was devoted to gardens: an estimated 4.27 of the whole extent of England. 
Table 3: The different uses of ‘urban’ land as Percent of All Land in England 
 
Domestic Buildings 1.14 
Non-domestic Buildings 0.66 
Roads 2.23 
Railways 0.14 
Paths 0.11 
Other 1.4 
Gardens 4.27 
Total Urban as % England 9.95 
Source: Land Use Futures, 2010 
www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/current-projects/ 
land-use-futures/reports-and-publications 
 
Tables 4 and 5 then focus on a broad categorisation of land use: in 1) the GLA area; 2) the 
South East; and 3) England as a whole. Table 4 divides land use into just two broad 
categories: ‘Built’ and ‘Green’ but also shows the area of designated Green Belt. Even in the 
most built up region of England, the GLA area, nearly 65 percent of the land was ‘Green’ and 
the land designated as Green Belt covered close to the area that was built on. Even in the 
relatively urbanised South East only 4.7 percent of land was built on compared to the 16.6 
percent designated as Green Belt. 
 
Table 4: Developed, Green and Green Belt Land: Summary for GLA, South East & England 
 
 All Built All ‘Green’ Green Belt* 
London - GLA 27.5 65.0 22.1 
South East 4.7 93.7 16.6 
England 4.3 94.3 12.4 
*Nearly all Green Belt land is in the All ‘Green’ category: some land is unclassified so 
numbers do not add to 100  
Source: Generalised Land Use Data 2005  
Table 5 shows the components of ‘Built’ and ‘Green’ for each region in more detail so one 
can see how land uses are categorised between the two broad types and also see the  
 
Table 5: Land Use percentages in GLA, the South East and England 
 
Domestic 
buildings 
Other 
buildings 
Roads Paths Rail All Built Domestic 
gardens 
Green 
space 
Water Other & 
Unclass. 
All 
‘Green’ 
Total ‘000 
hectares 
GLA 8.7 4.7 12.2 0.8 1.1 27.5 23.8 38.2 2.8 7.5 65.0 159.6 
S.E. 1.3 0.7 2.4 0.1 0.1 4.7 6.2 84.8 2.7 1.6 93.7 1,938.7 
England 1.1 0.7 2.2 0.1 0.1 4.3 4.3 87.5 2.6 1.4 94.3 13,232.4 
England 2017 1.1 7.1 8.2 4.8 86.9 91.7  
Note: Classifications changed between 2005 and 2017 so results are not strictly comparable. 
Source: Generalised Land Use Data 2005: Land Use Statistics 2017  
contribution individual uses make to all land. The main part of the table uses the 2005 Land 
Cover data. New data became available in June 2019 and the values for England are reported 
in the bottom row of the table. Classifications changed between the two surveys so most uses 
are not comparable over time. Again we see the reality; domestic buildings (houses, garages 
or sheds) relative to gardens cover about the same proportion of land in London as they do in 
England as a whole. Just, in London, there are obviously many more houses. Even so 
domestic buildings only cover 8.7 percent of the whole area of London compared to the 38.2 
percent which is green space or 23.8 percent is in gardens. Residential buildings and gardens 
covered almost the same proportion of England in 2005 as in 2017. 
 
Green Belts, Land Supply where people live and commute from 
 
From the above it is clear that Green Belts in England are very extensive. This is illustrated in 
Figure 3. Moreover although called Green Belts there is no presumption that the land so 
designated is either green, beautiful or accessible. Most remains in private ownership, the 
most important use of the land is for intensive arable farming which has significant 
environmental net costs (Firbank et al., 2011) and the only rights of access are by means of 
public rights of way. The area of Green Belt land relative to the total area of all English Local 
Authorities (LAs) for each year since 1997 is available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/green-belt-statistics .  
 
Although originally envisaged as ‘green lungs’ for city dwellers the purpose of the 
Metropolitan Green Belt as defined when finally designated in 1955 was just to prevent 
development. As the Minister of Housing, Duncan Sandys, wrote: “even if…neither green nor 
particularly attractive scenically, the major function of the Greenbelt was…to stop further 
urban development”.  That remains the function as confirmed in the National Policy Planning 
Framework of 2012. The purpose of Green Belts is to be empty spaces between cities, to protect 
the Home Counties from the encroachment of London and force urban expansion to jump over 
Surrey or Hertfordshire to Northants, Cambridgeshire or Hampshire. 
 
Since 1955 Green Belts have been designated for nearly all major English cities. In one respect 
they have been extremely successful. They have prevented development. We can see this in 
Figure 4 which shows housebuilding by LA between 2005 and 2015. London’s Greenbelt can 
be identified by where houses were not being built. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3: Green Belt boundaries 
 
 
Figure 4: Housing Completions by LA 2005 to 2015, South East England 
 
 
 2. Housing: Supply, demand and affordability 
Prices and Affordability 
House prices are determined by the interaction of the supply of houses and the demand for 
them. In turn the affordability of housing is measured as the relationship between the price of 
houses and household incomes. This is conventionally measured as the ratio of the median 
household income to the median house price and can be measured for any given geographic 
area. In economic terms it makes the best sense to analyse housing supply, demand, prices 
and affordability at the level of the city regions: that is an area centred on a concentration of 
employment and the area from which people commute to work in those jobs. The reason for 
this is that peoples’ demand for housing is determined by their incomes and most incomes 
derive from employment2. Thus a city-region more or less corresponds to a ‘housing market 
area’ with prices determined by demand for and supply of house within it. City-regions also 
tend to have common institutional and financial arrangements. 
We try to follow this recommendation where possible but a major problem is that data tend to 
be available not for city-regions but for administrative areas such as Local Authorities, 
Regions or countries. None of these correspond to geographic housing markets except by 
chance.  
It would seem most logical to start by looking at house prices and how these vary by area and 
over time and then to move on to look at affordability. Since housing policies do not directly 
affect incomes we do not provide very much evidence on these except in the Section, below, 
where we discuss demand. 
Prices 
Figure 5 shows the real (that is discounted for inflation) prices of land for housing and of 
houses from 1892 in the case of housing land and from 1930 in the case of houses. We see 
that although subject to cycles and – when demand rose sharply in the late 19th Century land 
prices spiked – there was no secular increase in land prices right through from the earliest 
date to the late 1950’s. New land for housing was always available at the edge of urban areas 
at the cost of agricultural land plus a mark-up for infrastructure. In effect we were making 
new (urban) land by extending transport infrastructure first with the London Underground 
and suburban railways and then with new road construction. However after supply of land 
became constricted by the imposition of Green Belts in the mid-1950s the price of land 
trended upwards but also became more cyclically volatile. Because the supply became less 
elastic in upturns the only adjustment was by price (not quantity) and similarly during 
downturns, only price could change, so changed proportionately more. 
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 There are a few markets in which retired people provide a substantial part of the demand for housing; even a few in which 
the demand for second homes is significant. But although these latter get much media attention, they are an almost 
vanishingly small fraction of all housing markets, especially if measured in terms of the number of people living in them. A 
study in 2008 found only 5 LAs where more than 10 percent of the housing stock was second homes and London Boroughs 
were two of these. The Isles of Scilly topped the list for rural areas but although proportionately high, the total number of 
houses was only 222. The study summarised its findings: ‘The impact of second homes on house prices and affordability is 
assumed but not proven. In particular, there is a lack of robust evidence to support the contention that second homes 
increase house prices.’ 
 Figure 5: Real land and house price indices, England or England and Wales 
 
 
Sources: Land prices are from 4 sources:  
Vallis (1972a, b & c) Estates Gazette – 1892 to 1969 England;  
Housing & Construction Statistics – 1963 to 1987 England & Wales;   
Property Market Report, Valuation Office – 1983 to 2002, England; 
Valuation Office Agency 2003 to 2008, England. 
House Prices: ODPM/DCLG: Table 502 Housing Market: House Prices from 1930; 
Deflated using the Retail Price Index. 
 
Overall, since constraints on land supply were imposed, the real price of land has increased 
some 15-fold. Real house prices have also increased and they, too, have become more 
volatile for similar reasons. But the overall increase in house prices appears to be 
substantially less. Measurement is imprecise especially over such a long period and the 
allowances for the changing characteristics of houses both in terms of facilities such as 
central heating but perhaps more importantly, features such as internal space and plot size 
may not be accurate. The broad pattern seems clear, however. It is to be expected that if the 
binding constraint is on land supply the increase in house prices would be relative less than 
would be the case for housing land itself. Houses can be made smaller and built at higher 
densities. Less land, in other words, was used in their production as more expensive land was 
substituted out of the house production process. 
 
These national trends conceal huge variation across space. In 2016 the median house price in 
Merthyr Tydfil was £87,000 compared to £935,000 in the City of Westminster. The most expensive 
LA outside the GLA area was Three Rivers, in Hertfordshire, with a median of £497,500. Across 
English and Welsh city regions at the same date median prices varies from £95,000 in Burnley to 
£428,260 in London. 
 
 
 Affordability 
‘Affordability’ is most commonly measured as the ratio of median house prices to median 
incomes. Figure 6 shows how this ratio developed in the 20 years from 1997: 
Figure 6: Ratio of Median House Price to Median Earnings 1997 to 2016 
 
 This Figure is reproduced from Housing Affordability in England and Wales 2016 (ONS). 
Since 2016 housing has become only slightly less affordable but over the whole period the 
trend is clear: the affordability ratio in England has worsened from just of 3.5 to nearly 8. In 
the literature a ratio of 3 is usually regard as acceptable so English housing is self-evidently 
far beyond this norm. Figure 7 maps affordability ratios for Local Authorities and Table 6 
shows them for City-Regions for the 3rd quarter of 2016. These are calculated somewhat 
differently so are not comparable with the ONS data – see Cheshire et al., 2018 for details. 
 
Looking at affordability it is almost inevitable since house prices have risen in real terms that 
they have become less affordable. Figure 6 tracked this process over the period 1997 to 2016. 
Table 6 summarises the relative affordability of housing across the major urban regions of 
Britain for the third quarter of 2016. There was substantial regional variation. Internationally 
a ratio of median house prices to median incomes of about 3 is supposed to measure a level at 
which housing is ‘affordable’. There was only one urban region in Britain where the 
affordability ration was less than 3 – Burnley in Lancashire – although there was one in 
Wales and several in the North of England and Scotland where the ratio was less than 4. In 
southern England there were few urban regions where the ratio was less than 5. In most of the 
most productive and attractive urban areas such as Oxford, Cambridge, Exeter or Leamington 
Spa the ratio was over 6. In the London region – covering most of the Home Counties – the 
ratio was over 8. Thus in almost all of Britain housing was unaffordable and, in the most 
productive parts, exceptionally unaffordable 
 
 Table 6:  UK Urban Regions1: Housing affordability Median House Price/Median Incomes 
 
1 These are defined as Travel to Work Areas  
Source: Cheshire et al., 2018 
. 
Urban Region1 
Median 
House price : 
median 
income 
Urban Region1 
Median 
House price : 
median 
income 
Aberdeen 4.744 Leicester 4.884 
Dundee 3.744 Mansfield 3.998 
Edinburgh 4.750 Northampton 5.171 
Falkirk & Stirling 3.248 Nottingham 4.114 
Glasgow 3.502 Bath 7.719 
Perth 4.408 Bristol 6.175 
Cardiff 4.037 Exeter 6.336 
Newport 4.213 Plymouth 5.233 
Swansea 3.482 London 8.163 
Durham & Bishop Auckland 3.410 Bournemouth 7.136 
Middlesbrough & Stockton 4.260 Dorchester & Weymouth 6.453 
Newcastle 4.150 Isle of Wight 5.085 
Blackburn 3.633 Poole 7.430 
Blackpool 4.332 Portsmouth 4.971 
Burnley 2.750 Southampton 5.929 
Chester 4.755 Swindon 5.405 
Lancaster & Morecambe 4.443 Bedford 5.462 
Liverpool 3.763 Brighton 7.788 
Manchester 4.306 Cambridge 6.759 
Preston 4.304 Luton 6.560 
Warrington & Wigan 3.718 Medway 5.111 
Barnsley 3.408 Milton Keynes 5.365 
Bradford 3.720 Oxford 6.365 
Doncaster 3.675 Peterborough 4.624 
Hull 4.086 Southend 5.969 
Grimsby  4.057 Market median 4.426 
Leeds 4.295   
Sheffield 4.080   
Wakefield & Castleford 3.934   
Birmingham 4.667   
Coventry 4.354   
Dudley 4.233   
Leamington Spa 6.901   
Stoke on Trent 3.728   
Stafford 4.659   
Telford 4.879   
Wolverhampton & Walsall 4.275   
Chesterfield 4.092   
Corby 4.785   
Derby 3.968   
Kettering & Wellingborough 4.559   
 Figure 7 maps comparable information but for Local Authority Areas. These are perhaps not 
such appropriate areas since they do not often correspond to ‘housing market areas’ defined 
as the geographical area within which people live and work. However the map shows 
essentially the same regional pattern of unaffordability. 
 
Figure 7: Housing affordability Median House Price/Median Incomes by LA, 2016 
 
Note: Income data not available for some LAs which are left blank 
 
Affordability is, of course, an outcome of the price of houses in a market and the incomes of 
those living there. It has long been known that the restrictiveness of the local planning 
system, because this conditions the local supply of new housing, has a strong relationship 
with the price of housing. Cheshire & Sheppard (2002) showed this and estimated the impact 
it had on economic welfare in terms of a measure of equivalent foregone income – think of 
that as an increase in income tax – in a highly restrictive local market in England. Hilber and 
Vermeulen (2016) rigorously identified the causal relationship between more restrictive local 
planning and the price of houses.  
 
Their bottom line estimate was that if, since the early 1970s, the South East of England had 
been as comparatively unrestrictive as the North East, then house prices in the South East 
would have been 25 percent lower. This was a clear lower bound estimate since not only was 
there a degree of restrictiveness in the North East higher than that in many other countries in 
the world – for example Belgium – but even by 1973 researchers were commenting on the 
restrictive effect of Green Belts on house construction (see Hall et al., 1973). 
 
Figure 8 just plots the general relationship between the long run restrictiveness of Local 
Authorities, measured by the proportion of major development proposals turned down on 
average over the period 1979-2008, and the measure of housing affordability in 2016. 
 
Figure 8: The Relationship between local planning restrictiveness and housing affordability 
 
The data underlying this are in Tables 2b and 3 in the Data Appendix 
A note on ‘affordable housing’ 
In the public discussion of housing affordability, affordability is often not distinguished from 
so-called ‘affordable housing’: that is housing available at below market price or rents. In the 
past Council housing was the most important source of this but since the introduction of the 
‘right to buy’ in 1980 the stock of social housing in the UK has fallen from nearly 6.5 million 
units in 1979 to roughly 2 million units in 2017. This, and the squeeze on local government 
finance since about the same date, has meant that Council housing has almost disappeared in 
the flow of new construction (see Figure 11 for an illustration of this within the GLA area). 
The major source of ‘affordable’ housing now is via Section 106 Agreements (so called 
because of the provision of Section 106 of The Town and Country Planning Act of 1990). 
These result from obligations imposed on developers as a condition of granting planning 
permission to provide some proportion of the housing built as ‘affordable’. Negotiating such 
agreements is costly for both planning authorities and developers and increases development 
risk since they affect expected revenues but cannot be known in advance (see Cheshire, 2018 
for a detailed discussion). As a result such Section 106 Agreements are often not made, 
especially by smaller LAs and for smaller developments. Table 7 shows some data from a 
2018 study. 
Table 7: Percent of Residential Planning Permissions with Developer Contributions 2016/17 
 
Source: Table 2.7 The Incidence, Value and Delivery of Planning Obligations and 
Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) in England in 2016-17, MHCLG, March 2018 
NOTEs: 
 Data in above table derived from a survey of all Local Planning Authorities in 
England. The response rate to the survey was 46%. 
 At the end of 2016/17, 133 out of a possible 339 LAs (39%) were charging CIL 
The problem with this data is that while all LAs were surveyed, the response rate was only 46 
percent. It is reasonable to assume that more active LAs with a significantly higher 
probability of charging CIL or imposing Section 106 Agreements, would be more likely to 
respond so the results almost certainly overstate the proportion of developments with 
contributions of ‘affordable housing’. Nevertheless it will be seen that even for larger 
developments – between 100 and 999 houses – 30 percent had no planning obligations 
imposed. 
Table 4c in the Data Appendix shows the annual mean construction of Section 106 housing 
for all LAs from 2015 to 2018. The results are illustrated in Figure 9: 
 
  
 Number of Residential Units 
Type of 
contribution 
0 units 
(Householder 
applications) 
1 - 9 10 - 24 25-49 50-99 100-999 1000+ ALL 
No contribution 96% 64% 45% 28% 26% 26% 7% 89% 
S106 only 2% 6% 35% 48% 52% 53% 76% 3% 
CIL only 2% 24% 10% 5% 5% 4% 0% 7% 
CIL & S106 0% 6% 10% 19% 17% 17% 17% 1% 
Figure 9: Mean Annual Section 106 provision by LA: 2015-2018 
 
 
Source: MHCLG Live Table 1111 
As can be seen the distribution across LAs is very skewed with 20 of the 326 for which there 
are data building none at all and more than half of the total of 13,304 per year accounted for 
by 15 percent of all the LAs. The biggest builders are a very disparate group: Cornwall, 
Tower Hamlets, Wiltshire and Stratford-on-Avon top the list and account for 10 percent of all 
Section 106 houses constructed over the period. Moreover, for roughly half of LAs the 
number of Section 106 properties built per annum over this period is insignificant, less than 
20 units.   
Supply: House Construction 
Let us now turn to house construction. There are two competing measures for which one can 
get data: 1) Net new dwellings; and 2) Completions. In this report we favour house 
completions. There are good reasons for this despite the increasing popularity over the past 5 
or 10 years of net new dwellings as a measure of new supply. Completed houses built can be 
unambiguously counted and data have been available for a long period. Figure 10 shows the 
total for England for each year since 1946: Figure 11, just for the area covered by the current 
GLA, goes all the way back to 1871. 
 Data for Net new dwellings, however, are only available for a relatively shorter period but –
more importantly – as a measure of new supply have serious conceptual defects. The number 
for net new dwellings is sensitive to the extent of any housing surplus or shortage. This is 
because it is the outcome of the difference between construction of new dwellings, the 
demolition of old ones and the ‘new dwellings’ resulting from the change of non-residential 
to residential use or the conversion of existing houses into multiple occupation (or from 
multiple to single family occupation). In the 1960s, when housing building was high, old, 
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unfit dwellings tended to be demolished; newly forming households typically moved into 
their own house or flat; and because housing was relatively cheaper the incentive to convert 
older, larger houses into flats was less. Over many years, house completions was a larger 
figure than net new dwellings because of the demolition of obsolete stock. As the housing 
shortage became more acute, however, demolitions decreased and older houses were 
increasingly likely to be renovated instead, and, most recently, some office building has 
changed use to housing; newly forming households have become increasingly unable to move 
to their own homes but continue to live with parents. So the more acute the shortage of 
housing, the more likely it will be that net new dwellings is a larger figure than the number of 
new houses built. This is, itself, a symptom of housing shortages. 
Figure 10: Permanent Dwellings Completed, England 1946-2018 
 
Source: Live Table 244: MHCLG 
As we can see from Figure 10 new construction increased rapidly after WWII, peaking in the 
late 1960s at about 350,000 a year. It then went into decline. Numbers are sensitive to the 
economic cycle with troughs in the early 1980s, the early 1990s and again after 2007. The 
point to note, however, is that since 1970, despite a slight recovery from 2008/12, the total 
number of houses built at each peak has been less than at the previous one and each 
successive trough has been lower. There has been a 50-year secular decline in house building. 
This is even more obvious from Figure 11 which shows 150 years of data for the area 
covered by the current GLA. The post WWII pattern is apparent but even the peak of the 
1970s is far below that of the 1930s. When house building was able to respond freely to 
changes in demand, building was able to really boom: in several years during the 1930s, 
during the worst recorded economic downturn in 125 years, building was around 80,000 a 
year. Even in the 19th Century more houses were built in the booms than in the post 1980 
period. House building capacity seems simply to have collapsed. 
This collapse of house building and the increasing unresponsiveness of housing supply to 
demand has sometimes been blamed on the collapse of Council house building. Again the 
long run historical data for the GLA area shows that this is not the case. Certainly it is true 
that Council houses accounted for a substantial proportion of the building in the immediate 
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post WWII period and in the peak building of the 1970s. But they accounted for only a very 
small proportion of house building before WWII when many more houses were being built. 
Figure 11: House Building within current GLA Area 1871 to 2012/
 
Sources: Compiled by GLA from: 
- 1871-1937: Report of the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, via Quandl.com; 
- 1946-1960: GLA estimates based on national data from 1946 to 1960 (DCLG, Live Table 
244) and London’s share of the national total before World War II (from B. Mitchell, British 
Historical Statistics, p392); 
- 1961 to 1969: Annual Abstracts of Greater London Statistics; 
- 1970 to 1989: Data provided to GLA by DCLG; 
- 1990/91 to 2012/13: DCLG house building statistics 
Table 8: Completions by LA 1980 to 2018 Relative to Population Change 
Local Authority New Houses 
1980-2018* 
Population 
2011 
Change in 
population 
1981 to 2011 
House building minus 
Population growth relative 
to 2011 population 
Bristol   31260 428234 43359 -0.028 
Cambridge 14980 123867 36673 -0.175 
Middlesbrough 13510 138412 -10788 0.176 
Burnley 7140 87059 -6219 0.153 
London GLA 647970 8173941 1565428 -0.112 
Oxford 14450 151906 58406 -0.289 
Barnsley 27950 231221 7318 0.0892 
Doncaster 28390 302402 15478 0.043 
*In total there are 11 missing observations affecting Middlesbrough, Oxford, Barnsley and 
Doncaster: these were interpolated to eliminate missing observations. 
Source: Live Table 253 for 2019 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-
tables-on-house-building 
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Table 8 makes a different point: not only are fewer and fewer houses being built in England 
but they are not being built where population is growing. It shows total new construction for 
a selection of LAs over the 38 years from 1980 and compares that to population growth (or 
decline). The last column tries to provide a simple measure showing the relationship between 
these two variables. It shows the difference between the total number of houses built in the 
LA and the change in population between the Censuses of 1981 and 2011; and then expresses 
that relative to the size of the population in 2011. So in Bristol there was a substantial number 
of houses built – 31,260 – but population increased by 43,359. So the difference is negative 
and, expressed relative to the size of Bristol in 2011 is -0.028. Oxford’s population growth 
outstripped its house construction by the most, however, so the equivalent figure is 0.289. 
Middlesbrough and Burnley are at the opposite extremes with declining population over the 
period but quite strong housebuilding. For those areas the final ratio is around 0.15/17. It is 
not a surprise to find in the Data Appendix Table 2b both – particularly Burnley – are 
amongst the most affordable LAs in England: and, from Data Appendix Table 3, are – 
especially Middlesbrough – amongst the least restrictive in planning terms. 
By differentially steering what house building there is to areas that are less restrictive in 
planning terms (including because there is more land not constrained by Green Belt 
designation) and where there is more ‘brown field’ land, new houses have been diverted to 
older industrial areas. The demand for housing is, however, strongest where income earning 
opportunities are best (and jobs are most productive) and population is growing. Over 38 
years less than 14,500 houses in total were built in Oxford, for example, yet still its 
population increased by a third. So it is no surprise to see from Table 6 that with a median 
house price 6.4 times its median income, Oxford’s housing market is one of the least 
affordable in Britain. 
 
The Evolution of Housing Demand 
We turn now to a brief discussion of long-run changes in housing demand over the last 4 
decades. Housing is a peculiar good in that it is both a consumption good providing ‘housing 
services’ and an investment – an asset providing a return both in terms of rent (or housing 
services consumed directly by the occupier) and a capital return via appreciation. Demand for 
housing services is dominated by households, in their role of owner occupiers or renters of 
housing stock. But owner occupiers ae also consumers of housing services and capital returns. 
The main driver of demand for housing services is incomes but arguably demand for housing 
as an asset is also driven by expected future prices, themselves an outcome of past price 
increases. Prices are determined endogenously in housing market equilibrium and themselves 
depend on supply. Incomes are largely determined separately. A large literature in housing 
economics has sought to estimate the income elasticity of housing demand. In the United 
Kingdom, the estimated income elasticity of demand is typically above 1 (see Cheshire & 
Sheppard; 1998) and Andrew & Meen; 2003); even above 2 (Meen, 2013; Auterson, 2014). 
Therefore, we expect demand for housing to at least increase proportionately with income and 
likely more than proportionately with it.  
The left panel of Figure 12 illustrates the long-run evolution of average real wages between 
1975 and 2017, measured in 1995 GBP. We can observe that there has generally been a long–
run trend to higher incomes, in line with economic growth in the country. Since 2007, real 
wages fell for roughly 4 years before stabilising around 2002 levels. Still, the overall long-run 
trend is undoubtedly positive, so we would expect a large increase in housing demand over this 
period. Regional trends have largely followed a similar long-term path (not shown), with 
slightly faster growth rates in the South over the last two decades.  
 
Figure 12: Fundamental Drivers of Housing Demand 
 
Note: Left-panel represents real average gross hourly wages for full time employees in the United 
Kingdom. The sources are the New Earnings Survey (1975-1997) and the Annual Survey of Hours and 
Earnings. Series deflated using the long-term indicator of prices for consumer goods and services. 
Right-panel represents the number of private cars per capita in Great Britain. Data from the Department 
for Transport statistics.  
In order to explore determinants of demand further, we look at the long-run evolution of car 
ownership by UK households. Car ownership has been argued to be complementary with both 
the consumption of housing and land consumption, so that increases in ownership over time 
could add to the long-run trend increasing housing demand, especially for housing land. The 
time-series for the number of private cars per capita is reported in the right-panel of Figure 12. 
We observe a substantial sustained growth in this number which approximately doubles over 
the whole period. Data from the National Travel Survey also indicates a slight increase in the 
number of cars per household over the last 15 years.  
These results emphasize that the fundamentals driving demand for houses and housing space 
have had a positive evolution over the long-run. It should not be very surprising that a long-
run increase in demand coupled with a supply which is unresponsive to price changes have led 
to higher prices after this increase in demand. In turn the appreciation in real house prices (see 
Figure 5) fuels the demand for houses as assets, especially since the financial crisis and 
resulting very low returns on other asset classes.  
3 Land Use and Changes in Land Use 
To understand the role of land availability as an obstacle for new development as well as the 
role of Green Belts as binding land use constraints, we conduct a quantitative description of 
changes in land available for development in each English region. Combining digitized 
cartographic data from various sources, we compute the amount of land available for 
development in each region, as well as the fraction of this land which is designated as Green 
Belt and how these changed between 2000 and 2018. The point of this exercise is really to 
answer the questions: have there been substantial changes in the amount of available land for 
development? How binding is the Green belt as a constraint for development? In the 
conclusion we briefly look at one example of how Green Belt land might be used for 
development: the area of land within 800 metres of stations giving access to London Zone 1 
within 45 minutes that has no designation or feature preventing its development except that it 
is designated as Green Belt. 
Figure 13: Land Use: Total Developable Land in England 
 
Note: Sample of spatial data used to compute land available for development: red polygons 
correspond to developed or partially developed areas using the 2018 version of CORINE land 
cover remote-sensing data. Green polygons correspond to areas of outstanding natural beauty.  
A second set of ‘scene setting’ information is shown in Tables 9a & b. These provide 
aggregative data on the quantity of Green Belt land in England over time and its distribution 
between regions. There are several points to note: as far as we are aware this presents the first 
detailed information on the area of Green Belt land designated, or being considered for 
designation, before 1997. It is noteworthy how close that total is to the actual total of Green 
Belt land in 1997 – the first year for which there are official statistics. The second point to 
note is how stable the total area has been over time. There was a redefinition in 2005/6 re-
classifying Green Belt land near Bournemouth to the New Forest National Park. Allowing for 
that, the total area of Green Belt land in 1997 was 1,605,000 Ha compared to 1,629,510 Ha in 
2018. 
Table 9a: Area of Green Belt land in England 1973 to 2018: ‘000 Hectares 
 1973 1997 2003 2004 2006* 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Area of Green Belt  1,681.1 1,652.3 1,671.6 1,678.2 1,631.8 1,635.9 1,639.7 1,639.5 1,639.5 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018  
Area of Green Belt 1,639.5 1,639.2 1,631.8 1,638.6 1,636.5 1,635.5 1,634.6 1,629.5  
* Note: From 2006, estimates exclude the area of Green Belt land in New Forest DC and Test Valley 
BC (47,300 hectares) which were designated as New Forest National Park in 2005. National Park 
status confers a higher status of protection in relation to landscape and scenic beauty than Green Belt.  
The conservation of the natural beauty of the landscape and countryside should be given weight in 
planning decisions in these areas.  Allowance needs to be made for this redesignation in comparing 
areas of Green Belt before and after 2005. 
Table 9b:  Regional distribution of Green Belt land, 1997 to 2011: ‘000 Hectares 
Region 1997 2003 2004 2006* 2007 2009 2010 2011 
North East 53,410 66,330 71,910 71,910 73,000 72,990 72,990 72,990 
North West 255,760 260,610 260,590 260,310 260,300 262,770 262,770 262,770 
Yorks. & Humber. 261,350 262,640 262,640 264,930 264,450 264,640 264,640 264,640 
East Midlands 79,710 79,520 79,480 78,900 79,000 78,930 78,930 78,930 
West Midlands 269,170 269,140 269,460 269,260 268,770 269,380 269,380 269,380 
East Anglia 26,690 26,690 26,750 26,300 26,270 26,100 26,030 26,030 
Greater London 35,220 35,220 35,220 35,220 35,220 35,220 35,220 35,220 
South East 565,100 565,250 566,190 498,670 519,020 519,490 519,450 519450 
South West 105,900 106,180 105,950 106,330 109,640 110,130 110,130 110,130 
* Note: From 2006, estimates exclude the area of Green Belt land in New Forest DC and Test Valley 
BC (47,300 hectares) which were designated as New Forest National Park in 2005. National Park 
status confers a higher status of protection in relation to landscape and scenic beauty than Green Belt.  
The conservation of the natural beauty of the landscape and countryside should be given weight in 
planning decisions in these areas.  Allowance needs to be made for this redesignation in comparing 
areas of Green Belt before and after 2005. 
Sources: Data for 1973 refer to the total of Green Belt areas ‘Approved’ and ‘Under Consideration’ as 
identified  on the Map of Cherished Land produced by the Geographical Magazine, 1973. All other 
data derive from Local Authority green belt statistics for England, MHCLG various dates. 
Table 10 assembles these data to show changes in the total land available for development. 
To do this we first compute the fraction of each region that is unavailable for development 
because it is physically unsuitable (e.g. coastlines, river banks or mountainous terrain), has 
been identified as having some intrinsic environmental or aesthetic value, or is already 
developed.3 Next, we obtain estimates of total developed area per region. For this purpose, 
we use data from the 2000 and 2018 editions of CORINE. With this spatial information, we 
can obtain an estimate of land unavailable for development by merging the areas with 
intrinsic environmental value, the estimates of developed area, and other unavailable land 
(e.g. coastlines, flood plains, bogs). Finally, using spatial data on the location of land 
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 Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB), a National Park, a Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) 
denominated as Green Belt, we can identify what is the fraction of land available for 
development taken up by this constraint. 
 
Table 10: Changes in Land available for development 2000 to 2018 
 
Changes 2018-2000 
Region Available for 
development 
Estimated Undeveloped 
Land within the 2017-
2018 Greenbelt  
Green Belt as % of 
Developable Land 
North East 
-1.10% -0.10% 0.20% 
North West 
-1.40% -0.20% 0.40% 
Yorkshire and The 
Humber -1.60% -0.10% 0.50% 
East Midlands 
-1.50% 0.00% 0.10% 
West Midlands 
-1.30% -0.20% 0.20% 
East of England 
-2.20% -0.30% -0.10% 
London 
-2.20% -1.20% 5.90% 
South East 
-1.90% -0.50% -0.20% 
South West 
-1.20% -0.10% 0.00% 
Note: Change in percentages of total regional area for NUTS1 regions in England in first and second 
column. First column records the change between 2000 and 2018 in total land available for 
development. Land is unavailable for development if it lies in an AONB, an SSSI, National Trust 
Land, National and Country Parks, it is developed or is physically unavailable for development. 
Developed land estimated from CORINE 2000 and CORINE 2018. Column 2 records the change in 
fraction of regional area that is both available for development and falls within the Green Belt. 
Finally, column 3 records the change in the fraction of estimated land available for development taken 
up by the Green Belt. 
We illustrate a sample of this spatial data in Figure 13. Red polygons correspond to the areas 
identified as developed or partially developed in the 2018 edition of CORINE. Green polygons 
correspond to Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty. When computing changes in land use over 
time, we will consider both of these categories as containing land that is undeveloped and 
unsuitable for development, respectively. 
Changes in available land resulting from this spatial analysis are summarized in Table 10. All 
reported figures correspond to changes between 2000 and 2018. The first column records the 
change in the fraction of the total area of each region that is available for development. We can 
see the fraction of land available for development has only changed slightly, by 1 or 2 
percentage points of regional area over this 18-year period. Given that the CORINE data will 
assign interspersed development as urban land, this is likely to be an over-estimate of the 
change in developed land at the urban fringes. It is important to know that, with the exception 
of London, 40% or more of the land in English regions is physically suitable for development, 
is not protected by virtue of its natural or aesthetic value or is developed. This change in the 
area available for development in these regions over a 20-year period is therefore relatively 
small.  
In column 2 of Table 10, we compute how much of the change in the total regional area that is 
available for development and is designated as Green Belt. We observe that there are 
essentially only small changes in the amount of developable land in Green Belts over this 
period.  
To obtain a more intuitive measure of the significance of Green Belts for land availability, we 
compute the fraction of all land available for development falling within these areas and their 
changes over time. Again, there is little change. In the case of London, we observe that the 
fraction of available land falling in Green Belts has increased, so that the constraints imposed 
by this designation are tighter now than 2000. According to our calculation, the fraction of 
available developable land that falls within the Green Belt in Greater London increased from 
89.5% to 95.4% of all land. 
CORINE is a very useful source of land use data since it has been available since before 2000 
and covers the whole of Western Europe in a comparable way. However its resolution is not 
very precise. It does not allow gardens for example to be estimated independently of houses 
and its category of ‘Continuous’ urban space is very restrictive while its category of 
‘Discontinuous’ urban space includes some very low density areas.4  
Table 11: Developed, Green and Green Belt Land: percent 
Region Domestic 
Buildings 
Other 
Buildings 
Roads 
& 
Paths 
Rail All 
Built 
Domestic 
Gardens 
Green 
Space 
Water All 
‘Green’ 
Other & 
Unclass. 
North East 0.899 0.510 2.101 0.143 3.653 2.412 91.188 1.708 95.308 1.040 
North West 1.356 0.809 2.842 0.169 5.175 4.171 82.894 6.189 93.254 1.571 
Yorks & 
Humb. 1.000 0.640 2.158 0.167 3.965 3.301 89.678 1.756 94.735 1.299 
East 
Midlands 0.917 0.548 1.919 0.118 3.502 3.469 89.746 2.079 95.294 1.204 
West 
Midlands 1.242 0.813 2.597 0.127 4.780 4.859 87.797 1.043 93.698 1.522 
East of 
England 0.948 0.529 1.877 0.095 3.449 4.126 88.102 3.009 95.236 1.315 
G. London 
Area 8.706 4.719 13.049 1.073 27.546 23.847 38.225 2.837 64.909 7.545 
South East 1.319 0.653 2.571 0.144 4.688 6.202 84.813 2.723 93.738 1.574 
South West 0.781 0.449 1.835 0.072 3.137 3.075 90.746 1.972 95.793 1.069 
England 1.139 0.657 2.337 0.136 4.267 4.266 87.469 2.597 94.332 1.399 
Source: Generalised Land Use Data 2005 
To provide a detailed snap shot of the total pattern of land use, therefore, we prefer to rely on 
the 2005 Land Cover data (used for Tables 4 and 5) and shown for all English regions in 
Table 11. This confirms what a small proportion of England has any buildings on it and how 
‘green’ our cities are. Table 12 confirms how little transfer of unbuilt land there has been into 
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 To illustrate: the swathe of land more than half km wide and 1.75 km long running north of the Thames in 
central London including The Inns of Court, Lincolns Inn Fields, Mecklenburg Square and Coram Fields is 
classified as ‘Discontinuous’ urbanisation although every built part of it is closely packed and high density; but 
in the outer fringes of London individual buildings and small settlements surrounded by open land may be 
amalgamated into a single polygon of ‘Discontinuous’ development. 
 
residential use over the longer period 1990-2011. So we can still rely on the 2005 data to 
provide a reasonably accurate picture of the overall pattern of land use. 
  
Land Use Change and Residential Land 
We next study land use changes towards residential use specifically. In doing so, we want to 
show how much of the actual change in land resulting in new residential stock comes from 
previous uses. With this information, we can measure how much of the change to residential 
use comes from land that was previously used for housing, and how much was built on land 
previously undeveloped. Finally, we can calculate the extent to which new housing 
development has made significant reduction in land available at the regional level by 
reporting it as a fraction of total regional land.  
There are no readily available digitized spatial datasets identifying changes to residential use. 
We therefore switch to using the Land Use Change Survey (LUCS) for this analysis. LUCS 
reports all land use changes yearly between 1990 and 2011 with a field indicating the location 
and size of the plot experiencing a change in use. Its source are updates of the maps produced 
by the Ordinance Survey. Moreover, it identifies changes between uses very precisely and so 
is ideal for our purposes. Using this information, we can compute total changes to residential 
use in the period 1990-2011 by local authority and region. The methodology used to compute 
these data changed in 2012 but for those values for which we judge it is not too misleading 
we show changes using the new series from 2015 to 2018. 
Table 12: Where is new residential land coming from? 
Region All changes to 
residential 
land use (Ha) 
From Previous 
Residential Land (% 
of all change to 
Residential) 
From Previously 
Undeveloped Land 
(% of all change to 
Residential) 
From Previously 
Undeveloped Land 
(% of all Region 
Land) 
 
 1990-2011 2015-18 1990-2011 2015-18  
East Midlands 13535 13.76 9.95 57.78 55.85 0.050041528 
East of England 18388 21.32 10.06 49.31 46.29 0.047407832 
London 5063 27.91 21.55 12.79 17.38 0.041150372 
North East 5287 8.86 7.39 52.62 54.18 0.032376422 
North West 14364 12.03 12.48 40.85 44.30 0.041436104 
South East 21780 27.46 12.39 44.38 48.26 0.050643086 
South West 13252 18.68 14.54 60.05 51.21 0.039227222 
Wales 2070 17.39 … 66.28 … 0.019173388 
West Midlands 11440 15.23 8.24 47.94 53.91 0.042176727 
Yorkshire and 
The Humber 
12149 14.97 11.77 46.83 48.71 0.036915072 
Note: Changes in Land Use obtained from the Land Use Change Survey: Period 1990-2011 and 
MHCLG Land Use Change Statistics Table P302. 
The main data in Table 12 correspond to the period 1990-2011 and have been aggregated at 
the regional level (data aggregated at the local authority level are provided in the Data 
Appendix Table 6). Several things stand out. First, we observe that a substantial amount of the 
changes to residential use originate in land that was already used for residential purposes. These 
land use changes are simply re-development of previous residential land and do not add to the 
share of land taken up by housing. Second, we observe that in most regions less than 50% of 
new development takes place in Previously Undeveloped Land. This number is remarkably 
low in London, but also moderate in the high demand areas of the South East. Finally, the 
fraction of land in each region going from undeveloped land to residential use over this twenty-
one year period is tiny across the board, encompassing a maximum of 0.05% of all regional 
land. This final point is important to understanding that residential development in England 
and Wales has essentially made no dent on the amount of green field land available. The notion 
that expansions in residential stock are happening at the expense of large, even significant 
swathes of rural land is simply inconsistent with observed changes in land use.  
The NPPF in 2012 introduced measures designed to reduce ‘garden grabbing’. If this is defined 
as the proportion of new development occurring on previously developed land then the 
conclusion would seem to be that the policy change had no real effect. The data for 2015 to 
2018 show that in four regions the use of undeveloped land increased but in five it fell but in 
no region except possibly London, was that change at all significant and the opposite movement 
in the South West was as substantial. 
How much land is available at LA level? 
What Local Authorities do 
At present LAs are responsible for allocating land for development on the basis of projected 
household growth in their areas. They commonly do this informed by a Strategic Housing 
Market Assessment (SHMA). They will also provide a Strategic Housing Land Availability 
Assessment (SHLAA) which is a technical exercise to determine the quantity and suitability 
of land potentially available for housing development; in addition there is supposed to be a 
Housing and Economic Land Availability Assessment (HELAA). Together these feed into 
the Local Plan which identifies actual sites suitable for development. Finally LAs are 
supposed to provide estimates of the proportion of a five year housing land supply they have 
allocated. 
Since all these functions are devolved to LAs there is great variability in the extent to which 
they are carried out, the methodologies and precision with which tasks are executed, the form 
in which the information is made available and even whether the tasks are done at all. LAs 
are supposed to have a local plan which is ‘up to date’ i.e. approved and adopted within the 
past 5 years. As at end October 2018 of the 338 LAs for which there was data, only 45 
percent had such a plan; a further 41 percent had an older plan but while it was not up to date 
they were in the process of devising and approving a new one; and 14 percent had no adopted 
local plan. 
Given this variation in the state of local plans it is not surprising that there is no consolidated 
knowledge of how much land is available for housing or where that land is. This is 
aggravated by the fact that local plans are just that: local. They are not held or made available 
in any comparable, even systematic way. To discover how much land has been allocated or 
where that land is, it is necessary to address each LA individually. The data is held in a 
variety of ways: some in accessible GIS formats; some in private GIS formats but much is in 
a pdf format, usually, but not always, publically accessible; some LAs just do not have 
information.  
The most recent date for which there is a central record of ‘Years Land Supply’ is 2009. LAs 
reported the percentage of a 5-year supply they claimed they had allocated. Summary results 
for the regions are shown in Table 12. For this purpose National Parks are classed as planning 
authorities. Including these, 313 of the 363 LAs reporting – 86 percent – claimed to have 5-
years of land supply for housing. The problem with these numbers, however, is that not only 
are they unverifiable but the assumptions underlying them are not available. They implicitly 
rest on both projected growth in household numbers and assumed densities.  
Table 12:  5-Year Land Supply 
Number of local planning authorities       
    
Government Office Region Reporting With 5 year land supply As percentage 
North East 23 21 91 
North West 43 39 91 
Yorkshire and Humberside 21 17 81 
East Midlands 40 31 78 
West Midlands 34 31 91 
East of England 48 41 85 
London 33 30 91 
South East 67 59 88 
South West 45 35 78 
National Parks 9 9 100 
England 363 313 86 
Source: MHCLG: 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120920065012/http://www.communities.gov.u
k/publications/corporate/statistics/landsupply2009 
For the purposes of this report we have gone to considerable efforts to collate data on actual 
land available from as many LAs as possible. This work was partly done already by Knight 
Frank but has been augmented with data for all London Boroughs and nine additional LAs by 
the LSE team. Figure 14 plots the relationship between the years of land supply claimed to 
have been identified by LAs in 2009 and the actual areas of land shown in their local plans. It 
can be seen that the relationship is more or less random. Newham and Aylesbury Vale, for 
example, were two of the authorities with the lowest claimed land supply on the 2009 percent 
of 5-years’ supply measure but had amongst the largest quantities of identified and allocated 
land per resident in 2018/9. 
Not only because of the fact that is it 10 years old but also because of its opacity and apparent 
randomness we do not place any reliance on the percentage of 5-years’ land supply reported 
by Local Authorities although the values are reproduced in the Data Appendix Table 7a.  
Unfortunately it is difficult really to conclude very much from the data we have been able to 
assemble on land actually identified for development in current Local Authority 
documentations either. It is very incomplete, not systematic and seems to employ different 
definitions and criteria. So it is not comparable across LAs nor, so far as we can see, do the 
quantities identified follow any obvious logic. Combining the data the LSE team collected 
with those of Knight Frank yields 73 LAs for which we have some degree of belief in the 
comparability of the land allocation data. For these 73 LAs we defined shape files for all 
areas identified from documentation associated with their SHLAAs. These were mapped and 
their areas calculated. 
Figure 14a and 14b show two scatter plots for the resulting data in relation first to the 2009 
values for the percentage of a 5-Year land supply reported by the same LA (Figure 14a) and 
related to outturn population growth between 2001 and 2011. 
Figure 14a: Land allocations 2018/2019 & Reported % of 5-Year land supply 2009 
 
Figure 14b: Land allocations 2018/2019 & Population Growth 2001-2011 
  
It is obvious that identified land allocations are related to neither the 2009 reported years’ 
land supply nor to recent population growth: the R2 s are respectively 0.005 and 0.05. In the 
latter case, although still not statistically significant, identified land supply is negatively 
related to recent population growth. We should also note that the 2009 years’ supply figures 
are unrelated to population growth.  So our conclusion on Local Authority land allocations is: 
we do not know how they are arrived at or what their rationale might be: but in terms of area 
they certainly do not amount to much.  
To sum up: it seems extraordinary that there is no centrally collated and verifiable data, 
defined on common and relevant standards on a subject as vital to our housing problem as 
planned land supply. 
 
Conclusions 
The evidence assembled for this report shows that while Britons think there is very little land 
available for housing because Britain is too tightly packed already, this is very far from the 
truth. There is plenty of potentially developable land but policies – particularly Green Belt 
designation – prevent its development. Moreover local planning authorities do not work to a 
common method or provide accessible data on what land can be developed or the logic for 
that land being allocated. It is very difficult to rigorously evaluate the land allocation process 
when it is all but impossible to know what that process produces. There is a system failure: 
the system of land allocation – for whatever reason – is not fit for purpose; nor can it be 
rigorously evaluated since the vital data is not available. 
There have been several proposals as to how to supply more land to allow environmentally 
friendly development. One such is to release land close to train stations providing easy access 
to jobs when there is no obvious physical, environmental or amenity reason not to develop 
the land except for the fact that it is in the Green Belt.  We can illustrate such a change in the 
context of two stations giving access to London Zone 1 within 45 minutes. One is Taplow – 
although the 45 minutes threshold waits on CrossRail – and the other is Northwood Hills on 
the Metropolitan line. 
 
Figure 15a & b: Land use around Taplow and Northwood Hills stations 
Taplow     Northwood Hills 
 
Table 13: Estimated Areas within 800 metres of Stations near London Zone 1 
 Area in Hectare 
 Water Woodland Farmland Suburban Urban 
Northwood Hills - 7.9 40.6 140.7 8.7 
Taplow 14.3 3.5 123.2 47.4 9.5 
 Source: Land Cover Map 2015, Version 1.2  
The maps are for 800 metres radius around each station and show existing urban and 
suburban development as well as broad categories of use of existing land.   Neither area 
contains any AONB, SSSI, Nature Reserves or publically accessible recreation areas: nor is 
there any flood plain land or land too steep to build. Table 13 then shows how much land 
would be available for ‘transit development’ if Green Belt designation was discounted.  
If one considers farmland and woodland as suitable for development so close to public transport 
except for the Green Belt designation that would yield 126.7 Ha around Taplow and 48.5 
around Northwood Hills stations. If one further required 10 percent of that land to be reserved 
for publically accessible green space, still there would be 157.6 Ha available for housing which, 
at a rate of 40 dwellings per Ha would allow 6,300 house to be built. There are, of course, many 
stations within 45 minutes of London Zone 1 since 45 minutes takes one out to Bedford or 
Reading, so this is just one illustration. A recent answer to a Parliamentary Question revealed 
that the MHCLG had undertaken an exercise which estimated5 “there were just over 57,100 
hectares of such land in England” although this land was not all within 45 minutes of London 
Zone 1 and might include some land unsuitable geologically or physically for building. It is, 
however, a considerable quantity of land. 
The evidence presented in this report shows that there is a serious and growing crisis of 
housing supply and affordability and that this is caused substantially, but not exclusively, by 
a long term failure to allow enough land to be use for building. This in turn is mainly caused 
by policy constraints imposed on land supply, since the evidence shows that the quantity of 
suitable land is very great – far exceeding the area of all existing development even avoiding 
all land with any environmental or amenity designation. There is even 57,100 hectares of land 
near to train stations not built on only because of Green Belt designation. There also appears 
to be a problem with information and a fragmented and idiosyncratic system for allocating 
new residential land supply. Other factors – such as fiscal incentives and infrastructure 
constraints – are no doubt significant as well but outside the scope of this report. 
 
  
                                               
5
 https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-
questions-
answers/?page=1&max=20&questiontype=AllQuestions&house=commons&member=193&keywords=
land%2Cnear%2Ctrain%2Cstations 
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